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amount of $2,347,00. These payments were made by the Second 
Injury Fund directly to the injured workers for permanent 
partial impairments, without any reimbursement to the insurance 
carrier. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute which created the Second Injury Fund was 
enacted to encourage the hiring of handicapped workers by 
spreading the risk between the Second Injury Fund and the 
employer in only those cases where the industrial injury was 
aggravated by a pre-existing incapacity, or in cases where the 
industrial injury was made substantially greater than it would 
have been but for the previous incapacity. The purpose of the 
Second Injury Fund is accomplished in those cases where the 
previous incapacity combines with the industrial injury by a 
special nexus, such as an aggravation or the substantially 
greater test. By holding the employer responsible for the 
industrial injury only and the Second Injury Fund liable for 
the previous incapacitites that added specifically to the 
combined injuries under U. C. A. Section 35-1-69 of the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act, the employer is encouraged to hire 
the handicapped by knowing that it will not be held responsible 
for the previous condition which contributes to, or combines 
with the industrial injury. 
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However, in those cases where the prior incapacity adds 
nothing to, or does not causally contribute to the temporary total 
disability compensation and medical care of an injured worker 
following an industrial injury, there should be no apportionment 
of liability and no reimbursement to insurance carriers. In such 
cases, the employer's insurer pays only those benefits that were 
100% caused by the industrial accident, and the employer, as well 
as the Second Injury Fund, are not responsible for medical care 
flowing from totally unrelated health problems that have no nexus 
with the industrial event. 
Allowing reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund on 
the basis that the injured worker had a previous health problem 
that was "unaggravated and contributed nothing in making the 
industrial injury substantially greater" would defeat the purpose 
of the Second Injury Fund. The law specifically requires that the 
previous incapacity "combines" with the industrial injury by an 
aggravation or by making it substantially greater than it would 
be otherwise. This causal nexus of "combining injuries" must be 
established. Unless these conditions of entitlement are met, the 
employer or its insurer shall be liable for all the medical care 
and temporary total disbility which was caused solely by the 
industrial event. 
In the two cases at bar, the prior incapacities were not 
aggravated by the industrial accidents, and the previous health 
problems did not make the industrial injuries substantially greater 
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than they would have been otherwise. Consequently, 100% of 
medical benefits were caused by the industrial injury and shall 
be the sole responsibility of the employer, without any right of 
reimbursement against the Second Injury Fund. 
AGRUMENT 
POINT I 
A 10% IMPAIRMENT FROM THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DOES 
NOT AUTOMATICALLY INVOKE REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND WITHOUT FIRST SHOWING A SUBSTANTIALLY 
GREATER REQUIREMENT OR AN AGGRAVATION. 
This action for review raises an issue of first 
impression on an amendment to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69 of 
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, enacted by the Utah Legislature 
in 1981• The question to be resolved is what responsibility the 
defendant Second Injury Fund has under the amended statute for 
impairments which pre-existed the two industrial injuries, but 
were not affected by or related to the injuries• 
The pertinent portion of Section 69 of the Act, the prov-
ision which determines the liability of the Second Injury Fund for 
the previous incapacities is as follows: (A Copy of the entire 
provision is included in Appendix A.) 
35-1-69, Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity 
Second Injury Fund — Training of Employee. 
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"(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent 
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes, sustains an industrial injury for which either 
compensation or medical care, or both, is provided by 
this title that results in permanent incapacity which 
is substantially greater than he would have incurred if 
he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which 
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, 
compensation, medical care, and other related items as 
outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the 
basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the 
employer for such compensation, medical care, and other 
related items shall be for the industrial injury only and 
the remainder shall be paid out of the second injury fund 
provided for in section 35-1-68 (1). 
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a 
pre-existing injury, disease, or congenital cause shall be 
deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical 
care, and other related items shall be awarded on the 
basis of the combined injuries as provided above; provided, 
however, that (b) where there is no such aggravation, 
no award for combined injries shall be made unless the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the percent-
age of permanent physical impairment resulting from all 
causes and conditions, including the industrial injury, 
is greater than 20%. . • ." 
In defendant's view, the meaning of the amended statute is 
clear. The plain language of the first paragraph establishes 
alternative requirements for entitlement to Second Injury Fund 
benefits: 1) Substantially Greater, OR 2) Aggravation. Either 
the pre-existing impairment must have caused the current industrial 
impairment to be "substantially greater" than it would have been 
otherwise, or the industrial injury must have aggravated or been 
aggravated by the pre-existing impairment. 
The second paragraph of the amended statute then defines 
what is meant by an "aggravation" under the first paragraph. 
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Aggravation provides under part (a) that any aggravation of a 
pre-existing impairment is automatically deemed substantially 
greater for that aggravated pre-existing injury, and that (b) 
where there is no aggravation no award for the pre-existing 
injury shall be made unless the percentage of impairment attri-
butable to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the 
percentage of impairment resulting from all causes is greater 
than 20%. Subdivision (b) is not applicable in the instant 
cases because the Commission held that there was no aggravation 
or substantially greater as required by the statute. 
In order for the plaintiff State Insurance Fund to be 
entitled to reimbursement for the payment of industrially related 
benefits, it must establish: 1) That each of the pre-existing 
impaired body parts were "aggravated by" the industrial event, 
OR 2) That each of the pre-existing body incapacities made the 
industrial injury "substantially greater" than it would have been 
otherwise. The State Insurance Fund has simply failed to show 
in either case, the previous incapacities were aggravated by the 
industrial injury OR that the industrial injury is now substant-
ially greater because of the pre-existing conditions. 
In the case of Mike Maupin, the applicant Maupin sustained 
an industrial accident during the course of employment on June 16, 
1982, when he fell from a ladder. The injury resulted in a 5% loss 
of bodily function for a sprain of the back, a 15% loss of function 
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for psychiatric diagnoses secondary to the industrial event, and 
a 17% hearing loss in the right ear. This totals 37% impairment 
caused by the industrial accident. However, when combined on the 
values chart, the resulting industrial impairment was 33%, 
Before this accident in 1982, the applicant Maupin had 
a previous incapacity of the left hand, which was rated at 22% 
of the whole person. The industrial injury of 1982 did not aggravate 
this left hand incapacity, and in addition, the left hand problem 
did not make the industrial injuries substantially greater than 
they would have been but for the prior hand problem. In other 
words, the pre-existing hand incapacity added nothing to, or 
did not contribute to the industrial injuries of the back, psych-
iatric or hearing loss. 
The State Insurance Fund, on appeal, erroneously seeks to 
receive a 46% reimbursement of all the medical expenses it paid 
in treating the applicant's industrial injuries of the back, 
psychiatric and hearing. The basis for the 46% reimbursement 
request is that the applicant Maupin had a pre-existing hand 
problem. This arbitrary request is made without any showing how 
the previous hand problem added to, or contributed to the medical 
care flowing from the industrial accident. 
The Industrial Commission ruled that the employer and/or 
its insurer, the State Insurance Fund, were fully responsible 
for the industrial injury only. By the Commission order, the 
State Insurance Fund is liable for all the benefits flowing 
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directly from the industrial event, including the medical care of 
treating the back strain, the psychiatric deficiencies, and the 
hearling loss. In addition, the Commission's order required the 
employer's insurer to be responsible for the compensation, such as 
the temporary total disability compensation for lost wages and 
permanent partial disability for residual impairments sustained 
by the applicant. 
The final order of the Commission is not arbitrary or 
capricious. The Commission's order is supported by the statutory 
langugage of U. C. A. Section 35-1-50 (compensation shall be paid 
out of the State Insurance Fund for loss sustained on account of 
such injury) and U. C. A. Section 35-1-69 (compensation, medical 
care and other related items. , . shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for 
such compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be 
for the industrial injury only . . . ) . In the instant case, all 
of the medical costs and temporary total disability were from the 
industrial injury only, and therefore, such benefits are the sole 
responsiblity of the State Insurance Fund. 
The findings of the Commission are supported by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The final order is supported by the 
Medical Panel report of January 10, 1984, 
"6. What percentage of medical costs were due to the indust-
rial accident and what percentage of medical costs 
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were due to pre-existing conditions: 
Answer: To the best the panel can determine, 100% would 
be due to the industrial conditions involving 
this 6-16-82 injury." Emphasis Added. 
In the case of David D. Sweeney, the applicant Sweeney 
sustained an industrial accident during the course of employment 
on July 18/ 1983, when a fiberglass fell and hit Mr. Sweeney on 
the head and neck. The injury resulted in the excision of a 
herniated cervical disc, which resulted in an industrial impairment 
of 20% of the whole man. Prior to this neck injury, the applicant 
Sweeney had the following previous incapacities: 1) 5% loss of 
body function of the lower extremity for a left knee injury; 
2) 15% loss of body function of the lower extremity for a left 
knee incapacity; 3) 5% loss of body function for a thoracic spine 
non-industrial injury; and 4) 5% loss of body function for left 
hand and wrist non-industrial injury. Based upon the above medical 
findings, the Industrial Commission ordered the employer and its 
insurance carrier to pay all the medical expenses for the treatment 
of the applicant's neck injury, and did not require the employer 
to pay any medical costs regarding treatment of the applicant's 
pre-existing left knee, thoracic spine, or left hand and wrist. 
The employer's insurer now erroneously argues that it 
should be reimbursed at 27/42 or 64% of all the medical costs 
that it paid for the applicant's July 18, 1983 industrial injury 
to his neck. This contention is made by the State Insurance Fund 
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without submitting any evidence on how the previous left knee, 
thoracic spine and left hand and wrist added to or contributed 
in any way to the treatment of the cervical neck injury. It is 
obvious from the Commission record that 100% of the medical costs 
in treating the neck injury were incurred by the industrial event 
when the fiberglass fell and hit Mr. Sweeney on the head and neck. 
The defendants contend that even if the "substantially 
greater test" of Section 69 is not satisfied, the Second Injury 
Fund is liable when an "aggravation test" is established. Recent 
amendment to Section 69 provide that the Second Injury Fund may 
be liable for benefits if substantially greater permanent incapacity 
results, or if the industrial injury aggravates or is aggravated by 
such pre-existing incapacity. 
The defendant Second Injury Fund concedes its liability for 
benefits associated with a pre-existing condition that is aggrav-
ated by the accident. Plaintiff State Insurance Fund erroneously 
advances the argument that whenever an industrial injury results in 
a 10% impairment all previous incapacities result in Second Injury 
Fund reimbursement regardless of their effect on the injury. To 
that end, the State Insurance Fund points to the ratings of 10% or 
greater for the injury and greater than 20% combined to argue for 
reimbursement when there is no aggravation and no substantially 
greater than. 
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Even if the applicant does have a 10% industrial 
impairment within the meaning of the statute, the unrelated 
pre-existing conditions do not give rise to Second Injury Fund 
liability. From its terms it is obvious that subsection 69 (1) 
(b) does not create a new form of Second Injury Fund liability. 
It operates instead as a limitation on the Fund's liability in 
cases where the "substantially greater test" has been satisfied 
but there has been no aggravation within the meaning of the 
statute. For example, if a medical panel reported that a 
pre-existing condition caused an industrial impairment to be 
"substantially greater" than it would have been otherwise, but 
the applicant's over-all impairment is less than 20% or the 
industrial impairment is less than 10%, no Second Injury Fund 
liability arises. However, the mere fact that an injured 
worker has an over-all impairment of 20% and an industrial 
impairment of 10% does not automatically entitle him to benefits. 
The "substantially greater test" must be satisfied, as provided 
for in paragraph one, regardless of the percentage of impairment 
involved. As this Court stated recently in the case of American 
Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, Utah Sup. Ct. Case No. 19134, filed May 1, 
1984 
The first paragraph of amended Section 35-1-69 (1), 
with the exception of minor wording changes unrelated 
to this appeal, is virtually unchanged in substance 
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from the pre-1981 statute. The plain meaning of this 
paragraph controls the interpretation of the remainder 
of 35-1-69 (1). 
The purpose of the statute under the controling provision 
(first paragraph) was obviously to require two separate tests of 
entitlement, and to provide that the "substantially greater" 
or the "aggravation" requirements should be applied under differ-
ent standards of proof. The new 1981 amendment of the U. C, A, 
Section 35-1-69 did not alter the test of "substantially greater." 
This test continues to requre some finding of a relationship or 
interrelationship between the current industrial event and all 
the pre-existing incapacities. Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega, 
562 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1977); and Intermountain Smelting Corp, v. 
Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
In Ortega this Court found a relationship between the 
industrial pain problems and the pre-existing psychiatric impair-
ment to rule that such an increase in the industrial injury 
satisfies the substantially greater test, Capitano held that the 
combined "effects" of both the pre-existing and industrial impair-
ments entitled the applicant to an award of benefits on the theory 
that the shifting of weight from the industrial injury of the 
right ankle to the prior Korean War injury of the left leg establish 
ed an "interrelationship" between the two injuries to justify a 
finding that the previous injury adversely effected his new injury. 
- 13 -
The "substantially greater" test therefore requires a 
finding of some relationship between the industrial injury and 
the pre-existing incapacity or an increase in the industrial 
impairment because of the pre-existing incapacities. As the 
Court observed in U. S. F. & G. v. Industrial Commission, 657 
P.2d 764-76 (Utah 1983), and has not been modified by the 1981 
amendment: 
. . . statutory authority exists to apportion compensation 
awards. . . provided pertinent conditions are met . . . 
(1) (previous) permanent incapacity occasioned by accid-
ental injury, disease or congenital causes, followed by 
(2) subsequent injury resulting in further permanent 
incapacity which is (3) substantially greater than that 
which would have been incurred had there been no pre-exist-
ing incapacity. . .therefore. . .the Commission is statut-
orily obligated to determine whether the subsequent injuries 
sustained . . have resulted in further permanent incapacity 
which is substantially greater. 
This Court conclusively resovled the issue of "substantially 
greater" in Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). 
In Day's Market the Commission denied the worker combined benefits 
under Section 69 because he had failed to show how the pre-existing 
incapacity had the "effect" of substantially increasing the current 
industrial impairment. The Court held: 
(Second Injury) Fund's only application is where the 
current incapacity is substantially greater. . .this 
language requires a finding as to the effect the pre-
existing incapacity has upon the current incapacity. 
Findings in the abstract as to the total pre-existing 
incapacity are of little assistance in making this 
determination, since the full responsiblity falls upon 
the current employer unless it can be said that the current 
incapacity is substantially greater than it would have 
been "but for" the pre-existing incapacity. 
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From the total language of the statue, it is clear 
that "any aggravation" of an indivdual body part meets the 
test of "substantially greater" for that aggravated body part. 
And where there is no aggravation no combined injuries shall be 
found unless the percentage of phycial impairment from the 
industrial injury is 10% or greater and the impairment resulting 
from all causes is greater than 20%. The words "any aggravation" 
simply means that there may be an aggravation of any body part. 
An aggravation is not restricted to certain physical structures of 
the body. Thus, an aggravation of a prior back problem entitles 
an insurer to reimbursement. But where the industrial injury is 
to the back and the prior health problem is to a finger, this is 
not an aggravation and the employer is not entitled to reimburse-
ment. 
The requirement of "any aggravation" under this definition 
requires a "causal connection" between the current industrial 
impairment and the previous incapacity. In the instant cases, 
no such "causal connection" was made between the industrial injury 
and the prior incapacities. The amended statute is clear that 
in those cases where there is no aggravation no benefits shall be 
awarded for those non-aggravated body parts without CL showing that 
the prior unrelated health problems have made the industrial injury 
substantially greater and in addition, the industrial impairment 
was 10% or greater and the combined injuries were greater than 
20%. In the two cases at bar, the percentage ratings are establish-
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edf but the "substantially greater" requirement under the 
controlling provision of the statute has not been established. 
Consequently, the Industrial Commission denied both employers 
the right of reimbursement where all the benefits flowing from 
the injuries were the direct cause of the industrial accident* 
Should this Court adopt the plaintiff State Insurance 
Fund's erroneous contention that they should be reimbursed solely 
under the 10/20 ratings for all payments made in treating the 
industrial injuries, the decision would result in the Second Injury 
Fund reimbursing all future cases for countless totally unrelated 
health problems, such as hearing and vision loss, heart and lung 
conditions, obesity, arthritis, diabetes, alcoholishm and learn-
ing disabilities due to previous conditions that existed before 
the industrial injury. Reimbursements solely because of 10/20 
percentages will allow a windfall to the employer, without 
requiring the employer to make a showing of how the previous 
incapacities effected the injured worker's industrial injuries to 
make it "substantially greater" or whether the previous body 
impairments were "aggravated by" the current accident. Such a 
result would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Worker's 
Compensation Act which is to apportion liability for the ultimate 
effects of the industrial injuries, but not to provide a general 
health insurance program for any and all health problems a worker 
suffers. 
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Considering the statutory scheme of the amendment to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69 and the cited cases, a clear 
reading of the Act establishes the following: a) the prior 
incapacities did not make the current injuries substantially 
greater; and b) the industrial injuries did not aggravate or 
was not aggravated by the pre-existing incapacities,. Therefore, 
no provision in the statute demands that the Commission should 
rule that the insurer should receive Worker's Compensation 
reimbursement for unrelated health impairments. The State 
Insurance Fund's position is in conflict with the plain language 
of the amendment and is based on an assumption that the Utah 
Legislature intended by the amendment to expand the Worker's 
Compensation Act to reach health problems completely unrelated 
to employment conditions, an assumption which is totally 
unfounded. 
POINT II 
EMPLOYER'S INSURANCE CARRIER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REIMB-
URSEMENT FOR BENEFITS INCURRED DIRECTLY FROM AN INDUST-
RIAL ACCIDENT, WHERE THE PRIOR PROBLEMS ADDED NOTHING 
TO THE INDUSTRIAL BENEFITS. 
The plaintiff erroneously argues that based upon the 
current industrial accident, the employer should be entitled to 
reimbursement from the defendant because the injured worker had 
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a previous condition, although the prior incapacities were totally 
unrelated to the injuries and treatment of those accident caused 
injuries. 
In the two entitled matters, the Commission has ruled that 
since the applicant's medical expenses arose from the industrial 
events, the payment of benefits was the exclusive responsibility 
of the employer. The position taken by the Commission is that 
before the employer is entitled to reimbursement under Section 69, 
the insurer is required to show that the previous incapacities made 
the industrial injuries "substantially greater" but for the prior 
incapacities. Day's Market v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983); 
Kincheloe v. Coca-cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d 764 (Utah 1982) . 
Or, a prima facie showing of an aggravation is required under the 
new threshold. 
Very simply, in the two cases at bar, the Commission 
denied the insurer any reimbursement from the defendant Second 
Injury Fund because all of the medical and temporary total 
disability benefits resulted from the industrial injuries only, 
which were the sole responsibility of the employer's insurance 
carrier. Clearly, the statute requires a showing of how the 
previous incapacities have acted upon the current industrial 
injury to make the new impairment substantially greater than it 
would have been "but for" the previous incapacities, or a showing 
of an aggravation of the prior condition. The plaintiff erron-
eously applies an additive analysis to the above statute to argue 
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that the insurer ought to receive reimbursement of all benefits 
flowing from the industrial injuries because the injuries combined 
up to greater than 20%. Such an application is contrary to the 
intent of the statute. As Professor Larson stated in describ-
ing the function of the Second Injury Funds in the American 
Law of Worker's Compensation generally: 
Necessity that second injury add to prior 
disability Although the prior impairment 
need not combine with the compensable injury 
in any special way, it must add something to 
the disability before the special fund can 
become liable. In other words, it is not 
enough to show that claimant had some kind 
of handicap, if that contributed nothing to 
the final disability. For, example, pre-exist-
ing partial loss of hearing was not a basis for 
shifting part of compensation liability to the 
Special Fund when the ultimate disability took 
the form of silicosis or an injured hand. 
Larson on Worker's Compensation at 59.32 (g). 
The defendant Second Injury Fund is not liable for 
benefits relating to the applicant's pre-existing unrelated 
incapacities because they did not make the industrial impair-
ment substantially greater, or were not aggravated by such. 
Nothing in subsection (b) of paragraph two of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 35-1-69 (1) expands the responsibility of the Second 
Injury Fund to reach unrelated health problems. On the contrary, 
this provision is a limitation on the Fund's liability, elimin-
ating cases where impairment ratings are below the specified 
level from those for which the fund is liable. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Industrial Commission's 
final Order by holding that before insurance carriers are 
entitled to reimbursement benefits from the special fund under 
the 1981 amendment to Section 35-1-69, the "Substantially 
Greater" requirement QR the "Aggravation" test must be 
statutorily satisfied on each and every pre-existing body part. 
DATED THIS day of July, 1985. 
Gm^er^ A. Mart inez , i 
At torney for Second /injury Fund 
and Industrial Commission 
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APPENDIX A 
35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent 
incapacity - Payment out of second injury fund - Training of 
employee« (1) If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or 
congenital causes, sustaines an industrial injury for which 
either compensation and or medical care, or both, is pro-
vided by this title that results in permanent incapacity 
which is substantially greater than he would have incurred 
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which 
aggravates or ijs aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, 
compensation and, medical care, whieh-medfteal-eare and other 
related items are as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be 
awarded on the basis' of the combined injuries, but the 
liability of the employer for such compensation and medical 
care, and other related items shall be for the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the 
epeeial second injury fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1) 
hereinafter refe***^ te as the ^speeial-ffcnd11. 
For purposes of this section, (ai) any aggravation of a 
pre-existincf injury, disease or congenital cause shall be 
deemed "substantially greater". and compensation, medical 
care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined injuries as provided above, provided, 
however, that (b) where there is no such aggravation, no 
award for combined injuries shall be made unless the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, 
including the industrial injuryf is greater than 20%. 
Where the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (1) 
(b) of this section previously has been compensated for, 
in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under 
this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
such compensation shall be deducted from the liability 
assessed to the second injury fund under this paragraph. 
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, 
medical expenses, or other related items are required as 
j* result of the industrial injury subject to this section, 
*the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible 
for all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other 
related items up to the end of the period of temporary 
total disability resulting from the industrial injury. 
Any allocation of disability benefits, medical carer or 
other related items following such period shall be made 
between %he employer or its insurer and the second injury fund 
as provided for herein, and any payments made by the employer 
or its insurance Carrier in excess of its proportionate 
share shall be recoverable at the time of the award for 
combined disabilities if any is made hereunder. 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical 
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, shall review all medical 
aspects of the case and determine first, the total permanent 
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions 
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of 
permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or 
conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease or 
congenital causes. The industrial commission shall then 
assess the liability for permanent partial disability 
compensation and future medical care to the employer on 
the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury only and the remainder 
any amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be pay-
able out of the said speeial second injury fund; provided, 
however, that medical expenses shall be paid in the first 
instance by the employer of its insurance carrier. Amounts, 
if any, which have been paid by the employer in excess 
of the portion attributable to the said industrial injury 
shall be reimbursed to the employer out of said special 
the second injury fund upon written request and verification 
of amounts so expended. 
(2) In addition the commission in its discretion may 
increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid out of 
such special fund, such increase to be used for the 
rehabilitation and training of any employee coming within 
the provisions of this chapter as may be certified to 
the commission by the rehabilitation department of the 
state board of education as being eligible for rehabilitation 
and training; provided, however, that in no case shall 
there be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation 
an amount in excess of $1,000. 
